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THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES IN BILATERAL COOPERATION 
DURING THE MAHATHIR AND ABDULLAH YEARS
Malaysia’s relations with Thailand can be described as paradoxical. On 
the one hand, bilateral ties had been the least ‘problematic.’ On the other, 
the situation in the Southern Provinces had constrained relations and 
this could be seen during the administrations of Mahathir and Abdullah 
which became preoccupied with finding solutions. In ‘aggregating’ 
these two polar states together (‘superposition’), one could construe or 
amplify bilateral relations within a broader range of so-called overall 
‘benign neglect’  that to a certain extent – characterised the approach 
of successive administrations of both countries. The objective of this 
paper as conditioned by archival sources as well as interviews seeks, 
therefore, to highlight the under-appreciated and overlooked role of the 
leadership factor in bilateral relations.  This is in turn co-related to 
developments in political contestations and reconfigurations centred 
in Bangkok (“national politics”)  which whilst promising little hope 
on the resolution for peace and stability in the Southern Provinces – 
contributes to the (unchanging) broader narrative. In short, directions 
in bilateral relations have been – to a critical extent – determined, 
influenced and constrained by the inability to achieve a breakthrough 
to the situation in the Southern Provinces.
Keywords: Mahathir Mohamad, Abdullah Badawi, Southern Provinces, 
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Introduction 
At the risk of over-simplification and over-generalisation, it could be stated 
that Malaysia’s relation with its northern neighbour, Thailand, is considered 
the least problematic compared with bilateral ties with the two other immediate 
neighbors, namely Singapore and Indonesia. Likewise, Thailand also seems 
to have the least issue with Malaysia as compared with its other immediate 
neighbours  Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. Except for a brief period in 2004 
when the incidences of violence in the Southern Provinces1 (Deep South) of 
Thailand escalated, Malaysia-Thai relations were relatively free from tensions. 
Thus, despite the problematic nature of the Southern Provinces, the state of 
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bilateral ties was to a significant degree  unimpaired, that is to say, reasonably 
maintained. 
It cannot be overstated that the principle of non-interference ala the 
“ASEAN Way” has informed Malaysia’s attitude towards the situation in the 
Southern Provinces (Funston, 20002). At the same time, it also cannot be over-
emphasized that the “ASEAN Way” allows for or accommodates “constructive 
engagement” (Haacke, 20073) subject to the consent of the member states 
concerned and influenced by emerging/ evolving developments or trends in 
the region (Katsumata, 20044; Khoo, 20045; Snitwongse, 19986)  within the 
framework of non-interference. In fact, such approach pre-dated the formation 
of ASEAN and was simply a natural exercise of bilateral conduct on the part 
of the then Malaya that harboured no territorial aspiration or ambition. Malay 
nationalism  in the mainstream as represented by the United Malays National 
Organisation (UMNO)  was preoccupied with retaining and strengthening the 
political status and privileges of the Malays  vis-à-vis the Chinese (and Indians) 
rather than with their ethnic counterparts outside British-administered Malaya. 
In other words, the carving out of the respective spheres of influence – under 
the auspices of colonialism – that undercut the historical kinship within the 
Malay Archipelago which makes for ethnic identification was both implicitly 
and explicitly accepted as a “given” by UMNO. 
It is interesting to note even the founding father and first Prime 
Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, who led the country to independence did not 
at the time consider the issue of Singapore’s incorporation into Malaya as a 
priority despite the historically deep linkages between the peninsular and the 
island. 7 It was the “left-wing” Malay nationalists who dreamt of and pushed 
for the ideal of a Malaya/ Indonesia Raya.8 The irony is that by adopting 
the principle of non-interference (in the era of post-colonialism), Malaysia 
(and ASEAN) can be considered to have “overtaken” the West as defender 
of an “absolutist” conception of national sovereignty which historically was 
alien to the “tributary” system practiced in the Southeast Asian region. The 
constructivist, rationalist and subaltern realist theories can all in varying 
degrees be discerned or found in the “ASEAN Way” of non-interference 
tempered by constructive engagement (Jones, 20099) – what Katsumata (2004) 
termed “the eclectic” view. 10  
This paper then focuses on the impact/ influence of the situation in 
the Southern Provinces in Thailand on Malaysia-Thai bilateral relations within 
the conceptual framework of (the “ASEAN Way” of) “non-interference” 
and the coordinating ancillary of “constructive engagement” (as two sides 
or dimensions of the same or identical, i.e. singular and monistic approach). 
The direction of the paper will be mainly (though not exclusively) from the 
perspective of Malaysia, and “periodised” from 1981 until 2008. A brief 
historical background to bilateral attitudes is provided as a prelude to the main 
body of the paper. Only then is this followed by an overview and highlights 
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of bilateral relations during the Mahathir Mohamad and Abdullah Badawi 
administrations. This has the advantage of combining the assessment of the 
foreign policy and diplomacy of Malaysia towards Thailand up until 2008 in 
terms of continuity and discontinuity with an analysis of the leadership factor. 
As such, an analysis and comparison of the leadership style and 
approaches of these two Malaysian Prime Ministers can be situated within the 
conceptual framework of “non-interference” and “constructive engagement”. 
That is, the leadership factor as epitomised (pre-) eminently by Mahathir 
and Abdullah will serve as the discretely concrete variable (independent, 
primary and ultimate) determining and shaping the extent of the influence and 
impact of the conceptual framework of “non-interference” and “constructive 
engagement” (as the dependent, secondary and penultimate variable) in 
Malaysia-Thai bilateral relations. 
Research Methodology
This research data obtained in the course of preparing this paper was derived 
mainly from archival sources as well interviews (as part of the field survey 
of leaders, experts and stakeholders)  in order to fill in the gaps in research 
on Malaysia-Thai bilateral relations during the periodisation presented 
in this paper. Thus, the research methodology in this paper is strictly and 
exclusively conditioned by qualitative analysis with empirical data obtained 
solely from secondary sources. The secondary data obtained corresponds to 
the periodisation (1981-2008). This is at the same time supplemented and 
complemented by more contemporary sources  to enhance the critical analysis 
and evaluation of the bilateral relations.
It has to be reiterated also that this paper is period-specific but 
simultaneously and concomitantly in its concrete-specificity focussed on the 
role of the actors themselves in the form of the leadership factor. That is, instead 
of critically evaluating the other (typical) trends and factors as such and then 
highlighting how the actors fit into the narrative, this paper looks at the role 
played by the actors themselves set against a particular period.11 This paper is 
therefore almost unique in its analysis of Malaysia-Thai bilateral relations by 
inter-posing the leadership factor as mediating between the inter-play between 
the problem of the Deep South and cross-border exchanges.
For a long time Malaysia and Thailand seem contented with the 
current state of affairs in their bilateral relations although there were many 
potential areas of bilateral cooperation which could be explored further by 
both sides. For many decades, bilateral relations have suffered from benign 
neglect and complacency and both sides seem contented to allow relations 
to be biased toward developments in the Southern Provinces. In other words, 
it would appear that much energy and attention in bilateral relations over the 
years have been focussed on trying to resolve the long-standing conflict in the 
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Southern Provinces. It is here argued that on the one hand, continuing concern 
for this non-Thai Buddhist (Malay-Muslim) majority region  especially on 
the part of Malaysia  has probably held back bilateral developments (from 
achieving its “full prospects”), and made the issue of the Southern Provinces 
the “organising principle” and diplomatic norm in relations between the two 
countries.
At the same time on the other hand, there is a deeper basis for the 
bilateral complacency, more so the part of Bangkok, due to geographical 
proximity and historical outlook.12 Paradoxically, this has bred disinterest and 
presumptuous familiarity bordering on contempt (as the English proverb goes) 
at the “unofficial” level of bilateral relations, i.e. the people-to-people attitude. 
Even more fundamental has been the self-perception of Thailand (traditionally 
known as the Kingdom of Siam) that influenced its attitude towards the 
surrounding countries, including Malaysia. For centuries, Thailand (Siam13) 
was a regional hegemon in its own right. And Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and 
Terengganu, from the northern region of (what is now) Malaysia, were once 
under its suzerainty until the Anglo-Siamese Treaty (1909). Prior to the Treaty, 
these Malay states had paid homage to Thailand by sending the annual tribute 
(เครื่องราชบรรณาการ) of bunga mas (literally “golden flower”).14
Moreover, unlike Malaysia (i.e. both the peninsula and the Borneo 
states of Sabah and Sarawak), Thailand had never been subjected to colonial 
incursion or occupation before. Hence, it had maintained its sovereignty 
throughout the period of Western imperialism. Furthermore, Thailand  under 
the reign of Chulalongkorn (Rama V)  was also the first Southeast Asian 
geo-political entity to be modernised through the adoption of Western-
type administration, and introduction of bureaucratic reforms which were 
progressive and forward-looking. 15
These factors provide the historical background to the general 
observation that amongst the political elite in Bangkok as well as the larger 
Thai society, there exist a level of condescension and patronising attitude 
towards the southern neighbour that had been quite prevalent to a certain 
extent. It could be pointed out, albeit, that such outlook no longer dominate 
the thinking of Bangkok and the mainstream Thai citizenry as greater people-
to-people exchanges facilitated by air and land travel contribute to correcting 
misconceptions. 
In effect, the customary outlook has been that there is not much to 
learn from neighbouring Malaysia which was seen to be little different from 
the then less developed Indochinese states. It has to be highlighted, however, 
that dynamic social and economic cross-border exchanges parallel the broader 
apathetic and condescending outlook. 16This is particularly salient in the land 
border areas connecting the Southern Provinces of Thailand with the north-
eastern state of Kelantan in Malaysia where historic and socio-cultural bonds 
have long existed. 
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Perhaps rather unsurprisingly, the rationale or motivation for the 
lacklustre approach could be framed as that of ensuring the situation in the 
Southern Provinces would not escalate into a high-intensity conflict. This is 
set against the backdrop of roadside bombings and shootings that have seared 
the geographical and social landscape.17 Hence, security concerns were always 
lurking in the background of bilateral diplomacy. Security concerns, therefore, 
became “engrossed” with the need to focus on containing the conflict  bilateral 
relations became negatively defined. The movement of internally displaced 
persons (IDP) across the border (prompted by a humanitarian crisis) would 
jeopardise bilateral relations and serves only to aggravate tensions and heighten 
suspicions (triggering a diplomatic crisis). 
Bilateral relations (1981-2009): A Malaysian Impression
The two Malaysian Prime Ministers from 1981 to 2009 took a keen interest in 
the situation in the Southern Provinces and in their own distinct ways sought to 
contribute towards improving the situation there. Arguably, Abdullah Badawi 
(2003-2006) could be considered as having moved beyond the “indirect” 
approach practiced under Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003) during which 
Malaysia limited its contributions to offering sanctuary (short- and long-term) 
and provision of human capital training (capacity-building). 
Instead, Abdullah sought to involve Malaysia’s role and contribution 
“directly” in the Southern Provinces through the 3Es schemes  education, 
employment and entrepreneurship. 18 Ironically, however, such approach 
implicitly regards and factors the situation in the Southern Provinces as a 
normative shape in the bilateral equation which when compared to the Mahathir 
era is somewhat regressive and retrogressive. This is because it constitutes 
an explicit recognition (by the Malaysian government) that bilateral relations 
have not yet progressed beyond the unrest in the Southern Provinces. 
Indeed, the Southern Provinces as a problem seem to be an inevitable 
factor in bilateral cooperation not least given the fact of their location in 
the border region. Thus, throughout the Communist insurgency in Malaysia 
(1948-1989), successive Prime Ministers have been concerned about the 
security dilemma of separatist movements operating in and out of both 
countries. Malaysia had played off the militants vis-à-vis the Communists as 
a “hedge” against Thailand.19 It was feared that Thailand might make use of 
the Communists to complement security and intelligence measures against the 
militants.20 
Ganesan (2010) argues that bilateral relations between Malaysia and 
Thailand from 1975 to 1988 have been very much informed by security concerns 
and structural cohesion of regional integration (ASEAN). 21 Implicit in this 
periodisation was that the twin substances of bilateral relations – security and 
regionalism – were deeply intertwined, and not so neatly distinguished. 22 Joint-
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security measures reflected the broader foreign policy outlook and orientation 
of both countries which in turn was grounded in the inter-relationship between 
the national and regional dimension of the Communist spectre.
Despite the mutual recognition that the Communist ideology was a 
common security threat which potentially undermines national sovereignty 
and destabilises the political systems of both countries, the problem of the 
Patani Malay militant groups was qualified as Thailand’s domestic affair 
(Nair, 1997).23 Ironically, this in turn would affect Malaysia’s attitude and 
understanding on the precise approach towards resolving border issues arising 
out of the movement of the militant groups refugees. 
The setting up of the General Border Committee (GBC) in 1977 belies 
the mutual mistrust tacit in the level of effort to combat the dual-problem of 
Communist insurgency and Patani Malay militancy. The climate of intermittent 
festering tension in bilateral relations was to find full expression in not-so 
subtle and less diffident terms during the Abdullah-Thaksin’s premierships 
where hitherto Thailand was merely inclined to point out its concerns about 
the operational presence of militants in Malaysia without necessarily implying 
collusion. 24
The Mahathir Years
In addition to movement of militants, an understated but persistent issue was 
that of the refugees. The issue resurfaced in Malaysia-Thai relations in early 
1981 when more than approximately 1,250 Patani Malays fled to northwest 
Kedah and also Perak.25 Again, both countries had differing perceptions 
of the issue. Malaysia was more predisposed to treat the self-exiled Patani 
Malays as bona fide refugees; Thailand regarded them as “agents of PULO” 
(Patani United Liberation Organisation) who enjoyed Malaysian support and 
protection, albeit unofficial26 Thailand had all along suspected that PULO 
rebels were embedded amongst the refugee group(s) with the full cognizance 
of the Malaysian government.
When Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003) became Prime Minister soon 
afterwards, he “confirmed” the refugee status of the 1,250 Patani Malays 
but not without extensive consultations with the Thai government. In fact, 
according to Nair (1997), approaching the issue was a delicate balance for 
Mahathir in assuaging public opinion, particularly from within his own party 
ranks (United Malays National Organisation/UMNO) and also ensuring that 
diplomatic channels continue to be kept open and engaged.27 This showed that 
the Mahathir administration was sensitive to both domestic and diplomatic 
viewpoints. At the same time however, the issue exposed the inability of both 
countries to arrive at a concrete and permanent resolution. 
Nonetheless, there were conscious and concerted efforts made during 
the administrations of Mahathir and his Thai counterpart, Prem Tinsulanond 
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(1980-1988) in the 1980s to extend and develop bilateral relations focusing 
on economic cooperation. The Mahathir and Prem administrations sought to 
leverage on the technical capabilities of the other country, and pool resources 
through public-private joint-venture initiatives involving or backed by state-
owned enterprises (or government-linked companies) in the areas of fisheries, 
petrochemicals and oil and gas. 
The geographical scope of cooperation earmarked was the area by 
the Gulf of Thailand and South China Sea. However, such joint-collaborations 
were not fostered and expanded, and hence eventually no longer in vogue as 
both countries competed to vie for foreign direct investments (FDI) as well 
as transforming (some of) their state-owned enterprises into holding entities 
entrusted with portfolio acquisition functions to build up the country’s reserves 
and sovereign wealth. 
Although Mahathir did not go so far as to directly involve Malaysia in 
the situation in the Southern Provinces, he was instrumental in forging a more 
cooperative relationship through the establishment of the Joint Commission 
(1987); 28 the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority (MTJA) in 1990; 29 the 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) in 1993; 30 and 
framing the Joint-Development Strategy (JDS) plan in 2003.31 
As a reflection of the lack of real progress towards developing bilateral 
relations which was characteristic of Mahathir’s predecessors, it was only 
under him that the first ever joint-cabinet meeting was held in 2002, and that 
also rather late in his administration. 32 One outcome of the talks was finalizing 
the details of constructing a 352km long bi-national (Trans Thai-Malaysian) 
pipeline which runs through the Songkhla Province to transmit petroleum from 
the JDA. 33 Thus, the Southern Provinces which is geographically adjacent to 
the JDA holds out the potential of policy congruence and convergence based 
on mutual and shared interests – in this case that of energy security.
The close but low-profile cooperation on the situation in the Southern 
Provinces naturally continued to include traditional security concerns. When 
Chatichai Choonhavan (1988-1991) took over as Prime Minister of Thailand, 
a new national security policy was approved in 1988. 34 Nonetheless, despite 
the overall bilateral good-will, mutual frustration at perceived inaction and 
half-hearted measures tackling the Communist guerrillas (as well as the Patani 
Malay militants), respectively, continued unabated. 
During the 1990s, i.e. the post-Haadyai Accord35 – that followed the 
official renunciation of armed struggle by the Communist Party of Malaya 
(CPM) – enabled both countries to focus security cooperation on tackling the 
militants. Mahathir had an excellent working relationship with Chuan Leekpai 
(1992-1995 & 1997-2001), and concerns also shifted to cracking down on the 
militants which posed a threat to Malaysia’s domestic security, particularly at 
the time vis-à-vis the Al-Arqam deviant sect.36 Malaysia concurrently withheld 
its covert support to the militants – hence, reciprocal cooperation was enhanced. 
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After Mahathir stepped down as Prime Minister, he continued to play 
a role in conflict resolution. When tensions reached an all-time high following 
the infamous Tak Bai incident in October 2004, Mahathir urged Thailand to 
consider autonomy as a solution which is supposed to “go a long way” towards 
promoting peace and stability in the Southern Provinces. He was reported to 
have said that “The best [the Patani Malays] can hope for is the formation of an 
autonomous territory ... whether [autonomy] is possible or not is not the point, 
but it needs to be worked at.” 37
In 2005, Mahathir was involved in secret talks – which lasted 
from 26-27 December – with representatives of the following insurgent 
groups: BERSATU (United Front for the Independence of Patani), Patani 
United Liberation Organization (PULO), Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani 
(GIMP) and Barisan Revolusi Nasional Patani (BRN)-Congress.38 The Thai 
government also participated in the negotiations although “official policy” 
compelled an outright denial at the time. A Joint Development and Peace 
Plan for the Southern Provinces was the result but no concrete steps were 
pursued. The Plan was very soon abandoned altogether since it did not enjoy 
official approval and much interest from the Thai government under Thaksin 
Shinawatra (2001-2006) distracted by the domestic politicking. 39
An admirer of Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew and their brand of 
authoritarian-style politics, Thaksin had a less impressive attitude towards 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003-2009). Within less than a year of becoming 
Prime Minister, Thaksin was confronted with the resumption of violence in the 
Southern Provinces. His high-handed approach to the situation made bilateral 
relations testy, and characterized for a very brief period by “megaphone” 
diplomacy.40 Intriguingly, the “timing” also coincided with the 9/11 terrorist 
attack on US soil. 
And ironically, it was Mahathir (and not Thaksin)  in what was a 
departure from his typical anti-Western posture – who expressly professed 
full support for the Bush administration’s “war on terror.” Hence, the “official 
narrative” on the Patani Malay insurgency – which at times could be unclear, 
confused and riddled with contradictions – became increasingly linked (though 
not assimilated or merged) with the wider resurgence of jihadist Islam as 
epitomized by Al-Qaeda and its regional partner, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). 41 The 
regional import of the Patani Malay resistance movement has now become 
further entrenched. 
The Abdullah Years
Malaysia-Thai relations suffered in 2004 onwards when Abdullah was Prime 
Minister until Thaksin was ousted in the September 2006 coup. Abdullah’s soft 
demeanor, unlike Mahathir’s no- nonsense approach, did not earn a congenial 
or favorable impression from Thaksin – it is not unreasonable to surmise that 
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Thaksin was probably concerned that Abdullah’s “weak” leadership would 
impact on his dealings with the situation in the Southern Provinces. Thus, 
Abdullah might vacillate on his predecessor’s commitment to repatriating 
fugitives who had sought refuge or sanctuary in Malaysia, notwithstanding 
the underlying and lingering ambivalence on both sides. Perhaps also Thaksin 
had thought that, given Abdullah’s religious credentials, the latter would be 
more sympathetic to the militant and separatist groups, and hence lack the firm 
resolve of Mahathir in dealing with them. 42 
Despite Thaksin’s misgivings, Abdullah was conciliatory and indeed 
took pains to express Malaysia’s commitment to cooperating with the Thai 
government in clamping down on “terrorism” in the Southern Provinces.43 
The lack of high regard for Abdullah by Thaksin contrasted ironically with 
the Malaysian Prime Minister’s personal appeal and popularity amongst 
the Patani Malays. Abdullah was seen as an Islamic scholar who conducted 
himself with dignity and elegance, and therefore a genuine statesman. 44 
Throughout Malaysia’s dealings with Thailand on the situation in the Southern 
Provinces when Thaksin was in power, relations were at their most volatile 
with improvements followed by deterioration.45
As such, the personalities of the respective leaders of both countries 
played a significant role in holding back the positive development in bilateral 
relations. And thus, overall bilateral relations tended to become “range-bound” 
or restricted and stunted in their development. It has to be noted, nonetheless, 
that much of the bilateral discord arose out of the megaphone diplomacy 
initiated and aggravated by Thaksin that was met with similarly stringent 
response by the then Malaysian Foreign Minister, Syed Hamid Albar. 46
Diplomatic tension reached a tipping point when 131 Patani Malays 
made their way across the border to Kelantan in September 2005 claiming 
refugee status. 47 This came at a time when the conflict became increasingly 
depicted in religious overtones (i.e. Buddhist versus Muslim). 48 In fact, the 
occasion for the self-imposed displacement was the death of a highly esteemed 
imam by the name of Satopa Yusoh.49
Amidst the bilateral tension, Malaysia tried to allay Thai mistrust by 
the reassurance that there was no intention to “formalize” the status of the 
group claiming political and religious asylum. Malaysia did however invite 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to interview 
the refugees which then sparked a furor with Thailand denouncing outside 
interference. Thaksin’s thinly-veiled response to Malaysia’s decision to appeal 
to the UNHCR was that “Without coordination and headquarters’ guidelines, 
a UN agency went out of its way and allowed itself to be trapped into local 
political exploitation that could lead to international misunderstanding.” 50
Malaysia’s chairmanship of ASEAN (2005-2006) and the OIC (2003-
2008) also profoundly affected bilateral relations with Thailand in the context 
of the Southern Provinces. Abdullah had sought to leverage on Malaysia’s role 
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in the two bodies to pressure Thailand to improve its handling of the situation. 
The response of the Thaksin administration to Malaysia’s advocacy was rather 
defensive and abrasive. Thaksin’s threat to stage a walkout of the 10th 2004 
ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos (29-30 November) if the Tak Bai deaths 
were highlighted by Malaysia raised diplomatic eyebrows51; and Thailand also 
did not warmly react to the OIC goodwill delegation to the country (2-13 June 
2005). 52 
However, Malaysia’s intention has been to prod Thailand in a stronger 
direction of alleviating the concerns of the former and that of the OIC, and 
therefore not to embarrass the latter as such. Malaysia wanted to increase its 
profile within the OIC, and the issue in the Southern Provinces needed urgent 
attention at the time. Bilateral relations marked a significant improvement in 
the post-Thaksin era. Thaksin’s immediate successor, Surayud Chulanont who 
acted as interim Prime Minister was on friendly terms with Abdullah. 
Incidentally, approximately one year after the ouster of Thaksin in 
September 2006 was the fiftieth anniversary in bilateral relations. Thus, the 
resumption of good working relationship between the administrations of both 
countries was timely. Indeed, Surayud visited Malaysia only one month after 
the coup. He also made three visits to Malaysia in mid-2007 – an unprecedented 
move. In addition to attending the Eighth Langkawi International Dialogue 
(LID 2007) and the annual consultation in Penang, Surayud joined in 
Malaysia’s 50th national day celebrations in Kuala Lumpur.
Several other milestones included the official opening of the second 
Thai-Malaysia bridge (better known as the “Friendship Bridge”) linking 
Ban Buketa (Narathiwat) and Bukit Bunga (Kelantan), respectively on 21 
December 2007. This bridge was constructed under the Joint Development 
Strategy (JDS) for Border Areas, and was expected to be a boost for cross-
border trade exchanges, and promote socio-economic development. The cost of 
the bridge project at approximately USD2.8 million was equally borne by both 
governments, and the construction was jointly supervised by the Department 
of Highways (Thailand) and Public Works Department (PWD) of Malaysia. 53
Relations with Surayud’s successors, in particular, Samak Sundaravej, 
who was a cooking celebrity (and aligned to Thaksin, and thus regarded as 
his proxy), remained good at least outwardly. Prime Minister Samak made a 
two-day official visit to Malaysia from 23-24 April 2008 where the issue of 
rice imports from Thailand (food security) was top on the agenda. This came 
at a time of the global food crisis which saw prices of staples including rice 
reaching USD1000 per ton, and above. 
At the same time, Prime Minister Samak pledged to uphold the 3Es 
concept vis-à-vis the Southern Provinces in recognition of the intertwining 
destinies of both countries. During the visit, Samak also took time off to visit 
a wet market in the heart of Kuala Lumpur’s shopping and entertainment hub 
the “Golden Triangle”  to compare the prices of food produce in both countries. 
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Ironically, Samak’s passion for cooking was to result in his leaving 
office after only less than a year. When the food crisis abated, it had seemed 
that bilateral relations reverted to a lower profile, and any residual diplomatic 
enthusiasm fizzled out. Nonetheless, business links (i.e. at the people-to-
people level) continued to grow with Malaysian companies emerging as one of 
the leading investors in Thailand in 2008.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to provide a general survey of Malaysia-Thai bilateral 
relations primarily from the Malaysian perspective in the form of spanning the 
two administrations of Mahathir Mohamad and Abdullah Badawi. The central 
argument arising from the survey is that both Mahathir and Abdullah sought 
to involve Malaysia as a solution to the intractable situation in the problematic 
Southern Provinces. But at the same time, both prime ministers knew the limits 
of what an outsider could do, and restrained from pursuing actions that would 
contribute to destabilizing conditions in the Southern Provinces. To a large 
extent, Malaysia treaded the issue carefully and was careful to practice the 
ASEAN principle of ‘non-interference.’ (No doubt, Malaysia-Thai relation 
was multi-dimensional  in that it was informed and conditioned by membership 
of both countries in ASEAN as much as vice-versa). It could be presented 
thus that ASEAN was the ‘external factor’ in bilateral relation that allowed 
for semblance of diplomatic normalcy and structural cohesion. However, the 
situation in the Southern Provinces acted as the ‘internal irritant’ that could 
have threatened the formal continuity of diplomatic ties. At the same time, the 
situation in the Southern Provinces was also the ‘internal factor’ that bound 
Malaysia and Thailand together on the path towards a common solution. 
Endnotes 
1.  The Southern Provinces refer collectively to Narathiwat [นราธิวาส], 
Pattani [ปัตตานี] and Yala [ยะลา]. Songkhla [สงขลา] Province 
(neighbouring the Southern Provinces) have 4 districts which are 
Patani Malay majority. See McCartan, B. 2009. War brings profits 
to south Thailand. Asia Times Online, 12 December  <http://www.
atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KL12Ae01.html>, accessed 9 
August 2011. The term “Pattani” (to refer to one of the Southern 
Provinces in their current administrative “form”) reflects the 
Thai linguistic version of “Patani.” The latter spelling is normally 
understood to refer to both the original inhabitants (demography) 
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